Shannon P. Carcelli

Research


I have several papers on the domestic politics of foreign aid, all from the donor perspective. Much of this work mirrors my book project on the topic of foreign aid fragmentation.

First, in two papers I develop and test a theory explaining states’ decision to fragment foreign aid authority over a variety of domestic bureaucracies. I find that aid fragmentation is a byproduct of domestic distributive politics. In the United States case, I find that fragmentation of the foreign aid budget increases when moderate members of Congress are ideologically dispersed (forthcoming in Journal of Conflict Resolution). This suggests that a proliferation of special interests are driving fragmentation year over year.

In a separate paper (Journal of Politics) using cross-national evidence, I find that foreign aid fragmentation is higher in states with electoral institutions that select for higher levels of distributive politics. Once again, this suggests that fragmentation is a result of special-interest intrusion into foreign policy.

Second, in work that is forthcoming at the American Journal of Political Science, I expand this work to consider the consequences of bureaucratic fragmentation. I find that states with more fragmented bureaucracies have a harder time complying with international agreements. I argue that this is due to the increase in bureaucratic entry points for special interests that oppose compliance.

Finally, in more work on the United States case, I examine the effects of congressional polarization on foreign aid. I find that, contrary to some observations, polarization does not necessary contribute to congressional abdication in foreign policy. Instead, it changes how Congress carries out foreign policy. Highly polarized congresses tend to rely more on the appropriations process to create foreign policy legislation. Appropriations bills include more, and more complex, limitation riders when Congress is more polarized.


US-China Trade War

In a series of projects, I examine political responses to the US-China Trade War. First, as an affiliate with the Princeton Trade Study, I am involved in survey work to develop firm-level measures of reactions and political responses to the trade war. This is an ongoing project.

Second, in co-authored work I use satellite imagery to determine agricultural responses to the trade war. We find that farmers in political districts with higher levels of support for former president Trump were less likely to change their crop planting behavior at the start of the trade war. This work has been presented at the APSA annual meeting and the Trade War seminar series at the University of Kansas.


I was a researcher for the Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS) at UC San Diego. As part of an active research agenda, I have contributed to the center through publications and working papers in several areas.

My work on nuclear weapons led me, along with my coauthors, to create a novel dataset of worldwide nuclear arms treaties. In a data paper previously presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) annual meeting, my coauthors and I examine the relationship between a state's embeddedness in the nuclear arms regime and the nuclear assistance it receives. We consider when and how international institutions can serve as signals of state intent.

I have also published two separate articles to the Oxford Research Encyclopedia, reviewing both the use of signaling in foreign policy, and recent geopolitical and empirical changes in the study and practice of deterrence.


In addition to my dissertation and cPASS work, I have published and presented on other political science topics, including the impact of prenatal androgen on social network structures and the determinants of foreign military intervention.